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I. INTRODUCTION

This case raises issues of first impression in Idaho concerning the scope and
availability of enforcement options for parties to a Trust and Estate Dispute
Resolution Act ("TEDRA") Agreement ("TEDRA Agreement"). 1 In its simplest
terms, the disposition of this case will determine what remedies party to a TEDRA
Agreement can seek when the other party breaches the agreement. 2
In this matter, the district court chose simply to dismiss the action brought
Donald Frizzell ("Frizzell"), a beneficiary of the Clifton and Marjorie Frizzell
Family Trust ("Trust"), in its entirety based solely on the allegations in Frizzell's
complaint. The ruling left Frizzell with no remedy. While vaguely referencing the
TEDRA statute's "petition" language, the district court determined that Frizzell's
complaint concerning the TEDRA Agreement was not an appropriate "petition" as
determined by the statute. Armed with the its plenary power and a statute that
expressly provides "full power and authority to proceed with such administration
and settlement [of a Trust dispute] in any manner and way that the court sees right

1 Idaho has adopted the same TEDRA statutory provisions as the State of Washington. Washington also does not
have a case on point.
2 Frizzell disagrees with the DeYoungs' contention that the ruling on this case will "create confusing and/or
unintended precedent," as the circumstances facing the parties to this Agreement are unlikely to be unique.
(Respondents' Brief, p. 1, fn. 1).
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and proper, all to the end that the matters be expeditiously administered and settled
by the Court," the district court dismissed Frizzell's complaint based on a narrow
reading of the statute and a construction of the TEDRA Agreement that ignored
clear limitation language and remedies. LC.§ 15-8-102(2).
As a matter of law and policy, this Court should overturn the district court's
ruling and permit Frizzell to seek enforcement of the TEDRA Agreement under the
broad terms of the TEDRA statute and the remedies available under the Agreement
itself. 3
II.ARGUMENT
A. THE COURT MUST APPLY ADE NOVO STANDARD OF
REVIEW.

A district court's dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P 12(b)(6) shall be
reviewed de novo. Coalition for Agriculture's Future v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho
142, 369 P.3d 920, 923 (2016) (italics in original).
Similarly, the Court "exercises free review" over issues of law decided by
the district courts. State v. Dep 't ofHealth & Welfare v. Slane, 155 Idaho 274, 277,

3 The parties do not dispute the relevant facts or procedural history in this matter. (Respondents' Brief, p. 1). They do
dispute the scope of the TEDRA Agreement's release and the district court's ruling. For those reasons, Frizzell will
not provide a restatement of the facts or the procedural poster of underlying the case as they have been fully briefed
by both parties.
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311 P. 3d 286, 289 (2013) ("Slane"). The interpretation of unambiguous contracts
or statues is a question of law subject to such free review. Idaho Wool Growers
Ass 'n, Inc. v. State, 154 Idaho 716, 302 P .3d 341, 345 (2012).

Despite the clear case law, the DeYoungs contend that because the TEDRA
statute grants district courts broad discretion to administer trusts, this Court should
"apply an abuse of discretion standard to the [district] court's decision regarding
the appropriate procedures for resolving trust disputes." (Respondents' Brief, p. 4).
Neither the case law regarding LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) nor the case law regarding
appellate review of issues of law supports a review based on "abuse of discretion."
This Court must apply a de novo standard of review in this matter.

B.

FRIZZELL'S COMPLAINT IS AN APPROPRIATE METHOD
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE TEDRA AGREEMENT.
1.

Frizzell's complaint was a petition to the district court to
enforce the TEDRA Agreement.

The TEDRA statute grants the district court "full and ample power and
authority under this chapter to administer and settle ... trust and trust matters." LC.
§ 15-8-102(1 )(b ). If the TEDRA statute is silent- or "inapplicable, insufficient or

doubtful with reference to the administration and settlement of matters"- the
district court can proceed in any way that it deems right and proper. LC. § 15-8-
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102(2). TEDRA explicitly permits a party to have a judicial proceeding relating to
any case or controversy arising under the statute. LC. § 15-8-201(b). TEDRA
authorizes an action "incidental to an existing judicial proceeding" or as a new
action. LC. § 15-8-202. The nonjudicial resolution process, or TEDRA Agreement
process, is a supplement to, not a derogation from, the provisions authorized by
statute or common law. LC. § 15-8-301. Parties to a TEDRA Agreement have an
option to file the agreement with the court; however, filing is not required for the
TEDRA Agreement to be binding and enforceable. LC.§ 15-8-303.
TEDRA is silent as to the procedural enforcement of binding nonjudicial
agreements, should a party believe such an agreement has been breached. LC. §
15-8-101, et seq. Frizzell, pursuant to LC.§ 15-8-201(b) and LC.§ 15-8-202, filed
a complaint to enforce the parties' TEDRA Agreement. The district court admitted
that the TEDRA statute allows "for parties to seek enforcement of the TEDRA
agreement by petition," but determined that Frizzell's complaint was not an
appropriate "petition" in its ruling granting the DeYoungs' motion to dismiss.
Petition is not defined in the TEDRA Statute. LC. § 18-5-101, et seq. The
statute permits a party to bring a new action, and a district court may consolidate
that new action with the original action in exercise of its plenary powers. LC. § 15-
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8-202(3). Such consolidation is not required, as the legislature chose the word
"may" over shall. Id Frizzell's complaint was a petition to the district court to
enforce the TEDRA Agreement in the form of a complaint.
2.

Frizzell's complaint was a TEDRA complaint.

Contrary to the DeYoungs' assertions, Frizzell did not need the district court
to "convert" his complaint "into a TEDRA cause of action"- it was a TEDRA
cause of action. (Respondents' Brief, p. 16). The DeYoungs' (and the district
court's) narrow view of Frizzell's complaint is misplaced. (Respondents' Brief, p.
16).
Idaho is a notice pleading state pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) (a complaint
need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief'). As the DeYoungs rightly note, a party is not
"slavishly bound to stating particular theories" of law in its complaint. Seiniger
Law Office, P.A. v. NPac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241,246, 178 P.3d 606, 611 (2009)

(internal citations omitted). (Respondents' Brief, p. 17). Pleadings are to be
liberally construed. Id A complaint is valid if the adverse party is put on notice of
the claims being brought against it. Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Dep 't, 139
Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d 845, 849 (2003).

5

"A complaint need not identify the statutory basis for relief nor include a
formal statement of the cause of action ... [but] there must be some indication of the
theory of recovery." Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 808, 229 P.3d
1164, 1170 (2010) (italics in original). Brown is applicable, not as a bar to
Frizzell's complaint but as a boost. As in Brown, the eagle eyes of a "hypervigilant attorney" are not needed to see that the entirety of Frizzell's complaint
falls squarely within the four comers of the TEDRA statute. Id. at 1171-1172.
While Frizzell's complaint references damages as a remedy, the damages result
from injuries suffered by Frizzell due to the DeYoungs' administration of a trust
and their breach of a TEDRA Agreement.
In fact, the word "trust" appeared nine times in just the first nine paragraphs
of the complaint. (R. 6-7). A full eleven paragraphs were devoted solely to the
terms of the parties' TEDRA Agreement in the "Background" section of Frizzell's
complaint. (R. 8-11 ). The Frizzell Trust and the TEDRA Agreement were
appended to the complaint as exhibits. (R. 36-93, Exs. A & B). Each cause of
action, save the twelfth of thirteen, enumerated facts and legal allegations related
exclusively to the DeYoungs' administration of the Trust pursuant to the Trust's
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original terms and the TEDRA Agreement. (R. 11-34). 4 The acronym TEDRA
appears on 17 of the complaint's 30 pages. (R. 6-35). Short of adding a flashing
neon caption stating "TEDRA Complaint," or specific references to portions of the
TEDRA statute, the DeYoungs could not have had any more notice of the causes
of action underlying Frizzell's complaint.
All trust and estate disputes in Idaho are governed by TEDRA, i.e. the Trust
and Estate Dispute Resolution Act. I.C. 15-8-101, et seq. Even if Frizzell had not

referenced the "TEDRA Agreement" or the Frizzell trust explicitly- which he
repeatedly did- the DeYoungs would be put on notice that Frizzell 's complaint
was a TEDRA action. It is either disingenuous or naive for the DeYoungs' to assert
that they did not know the complaint arose under the TEDRA statute. Either way,
Frizzell satisfied Idaho's notice pleading requirements.
3.

Frizzell was permitted to file a complaint to enforce a
contract, the TEDRA Agreement.

A party to a contract can always seek judicial enforcement of the contract's
terms by initiating a lawsuit in court with appropriate jurisdiction. A TEDRA
Agreement is merely a settlement contract, which "stands on the same footing as

4 The twelfth cause of action is for punitive damages, which reference's Edwin DeYoung's conduct, but unlike the
other causes of action does not explicitly use the word "Trust" or the phrase "TEDRA Agreement." (R. 32).
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any other contract and is governed by the same rules and principles as are
applicable to contracts generally." Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664,
672, 249 P. 3d 857, 865 (2011). A TEDRA Agreement, or binding nonjudicial
resolution, must be in writing and signed by all parties. LC. § 15-8-302. Once
signed, the TEDRA Agreement is binding and conclusive upon all parties for the
subject matter of the dispute. Id. The TEDRA Agreement is binding whether or not
the parties thereto take the optional step to file it with the court. LC. § 15-8-303.

Black's Law Dictionary, ninth edition, defines a contract as "an agreement
between two or more parties creating obligations that are enforceable or otherwise
recognizable at law." The Frizzell Trust TEDRA Agreement outlined the parties'
agreement to modify the terms of the Frizzell Trust, compelled certain actions by
Frizzell and the DeYoungs, and defined its own breach. Specifically, "[ eJach party
agrees to do all acts and sign all documents necessary to carry out the terms and
provisions of this Agreement and acknowledges that any failure to do so will be
considered a breach of this Agreement." (R. 107). While the TEDRA Agreement
did not identify a preferred enforcement mechanism or venue, it did provide for
reimbursement and indemnification by the prevailing party for all costs and
reasonable expenses "including without limitation court costs and reasonable
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attorneys' fees." (R. 107). The explicit reference to "court costs" indicated the
parties considered the possibility of litigation to enforce the TEDRA Agreement in
the event of breach.
The TEDRA Agreement did not reference or allude or outline any
requirements for Frizzell and the DeYoungs to seek additional, nonjudicial
remedies nor did it defme how the parties should "petition" the court in addressing
breaches. The Idaho legislature permits parties to pursue "an action upon any
contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing" within five
years of breach. LC. 5-216. Frizzell pursued this action for breaches occurring after
his execution of the TEDRA Agreement in October 2014, by initiating a lawsuit in
2016. (R. 6).

C.

FRIZZELL DID NOT RELEASE DEYOUNG TO FREELY
BREACH THE TEDRA AGREEMENT.

The parties agreed that the TEDRA Agreement, like any other contract, must
be construed as a whole, considering all parts. Salfeety v. Seidman (In re Estate of
Kirk), 127 Idaho 817, 827, 907 P.2d 794 (1995). The DeYoungs and the district
court concurred with Frizzell that "a court's primary objective is to discover the
intent of the parties through viewing the document in its entirety." Bondy v. Levy,
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121 Idaho 993, 996, 829 P. 2d 1342 (1992). However, the district court and the
DeYoungs ignored key limiting language that appears repeatedly in the TEDRA
Agreement, providing a limitation to the waiver and release contained therein.
Instead, the DeYoungs and the district court determined that Frizzell, and the
express language of the TEDRA Agreement, permitted DeYoung to breach all his
obligations under both the trust and the Agreement without limitation.
It is true that both Frizzell and the DeYoungs agreed to certain releases and
indemnification language within the TEDRA Agreement. (R. 78-79, 115 .5-7; R.
80-81, 19). However, those releases were not unlimited. The district court correctly
noted that "[t]he parties executed the TEDRA agreement to resolve certain issues
between the parties that had arisen prior to the execution of the TEDRA
agreement, modify the trust, and subject resolution of Trust disputes to the
provisions of Idaho Code § 15-8-101 et seq." (R. 163). A court must construe any
agreement "so as to give force and effect to every part of the agreement." Palomo
v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 314,317,955 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1998).

Paragraph nine of the agreement releases DeYoung from "any claims .. .in
his capacity as Trustee that" Frizzell now, ever, "may have had, or may there after
have from the inception of the Family Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust
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and the OTIP Trust up to the date this Agreement is executed." (R. 80)
(emphasis added). While the release included future claims ("may there after (sic)
have"), the TEDRA Agreement limited the release of claims to those that Frizzell
could have brought prior to the date the agreement was executed. By way of
example, should Frizzell have discovered four months after he signed the TEDRA
Agreement that DeYoung breached the terms of the original Trust in 2013, Frizzell
would be barred from bringing claims related to that conduct. The TEDRA
agreement barred claims that Frizzell knew about or should have known about that
arose from conduct prior to the agreement's execution. The very next sentence in
the TEDRA Agreement made that clear: "Such release is limited to claims that
were asserted or could have been asserted ... " (R. 80) (emphasis added).
The next paragraph releases Frizzell from claims that DeYoung "brought or
could have brought" in the original 2009 litigation. (R. 80). Again, the release was
limited to those claims "as of the date of execution of the Agreeement." (R. 81).
The date of execution of the Agreement provided a bright line between past
conduct (barred claims) and future conduct (permitted claims).
The district court and the DeYoungs ignored repeated temporal limitation
language ("as of the date of the agreement") and the express release limitation
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("claims that were asserted or could have been asserted... "), and instead, construed
the agreement as Frizzell's acquiescence to DeYoungs' carte blanche breach of the
TEDRA Agreement. Removing those clear, unambiguous limitations changed the
parties' express written intent.
Frizzell waived his right to relitigate claims he had already asserted or could
have asserted in the 2009 litigation up October 27, 2014. (R. 83). Frizzell did not
waive his right to litigate DeYoungs' fiduciary breaches of the express terms of
TEDRA Agreement. Had any of Frizzell's allegations concerned conduct prior to
October 27, 2014, those properly could have been dismissed by the clear language
of the TEDRA Agreement. However, the conduct alleged in Frizzell's complaint
occurred after the execution of the agreement and related to DeYoungs' agreed to
duties delineated in the agreement. The dismissal of those claims by the district
court was improper, as it rendered portions of the parties' TEDRA Agreement
meaningless.
III. CONCLUSION
Neither the DeYoungs nor the district court presented sufficient legal
reasons to dismiss Frizzell's complaint. Facing a TEDRA complaint, governed by
a broadly construed statute with explicit reference to the court's plenary powers to
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fashion trust dispute remedies, the district court simply declined to fashion any
remedy. The district court could have: (1) deny the motion to dismiss and permit
Frizzell the opportunity to prove or disprove his allegations through discovery and
motion practice; (2) deny the motion and direct Frizzell to amend his complaint;
(3) deny the motion and seek contempt remedies against the DeYoungs; (4) deny
the motion and consolidate the new case with the 2009 action; or (5) deny the
motion and direct the parties to amend their TEDRA Agreement. Instead, the
district court granted the motion to dismiss by altering the specific terms of the
TEDRA Agreement.
The district court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. This Court must
reverse the district court's decision and remand this matter for further proceedings.
This Court should also grant Frizzell his reasonable attorneys' fees in conjunction
with this appeal.
"){~

DATED this :2_ day of September, 2017.

?'tR<}~Jl k ·'J'.i:aynes, ISB #8425
/ Attorneys for Appellant
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